Race Discrimination
Discharge of an employee based on racial bias is actionable under state and federal laws. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “requires the elimination of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.” An at-will employee’s claim of racially motivated retaliatory discharge for filing a discrimination complaint can be actionable in tort as a violation of public policy.
The Civil Service Commission was found to have acted improperly in suspending a black licensed practical nurse as a result of a physical altercation with a white coworker in Theodore v. Department of Health & Human Services. A crib being pushed by the black nurse had accidentally struck the white nurse. Evidence at trial supported the black nurse’s contentions that she apologized for the accident. The white nurse struck the first blow and spoke inflammatory slurs. The black nurse’s reaction had been defensive. The facts revealed no grounds for suspension or disciplinary action against the black nurse.
The Bethany Methodist Corporation’s medical and skilled nursing care facility terminated a black certified nursing assistant because of its determination that she abused a patient on four separate occasions in Billups v. Methodist Hospital of Chicago. The appellate court upheld a lower court order entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff did not offer traditional forms of indirect evidence to prove racial discrimination, such as statistics or evidence of comparable situations. There was no evidence in the record suggesting that Bethany terminated black employees more frequently for physically abusing a patient, while retaining nonblack employees.
In Buckley Nursing Home v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Young, a black applicant for a nurse’s aide position, filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination. Young responded to a newspaper advertisement for a nurse’s aide position, filing her application on March 1, 1974, and was interviewed by the acting supervisor of nursing. The applicant called to inquire about the position on several occasions and eventually was told that the position had been filled. The advertisement ran again in the newspaper, and the applicant again called in response to the advertisement. Young was told that her application was on file and that she would be called as needed. The facility hired four full-time and one part-time nurse’s aides for the evening shifts between March 1, 1974, and July 1, 1974.
On the upper right hand corner of Young’s application, there is a handwritten notation reading “no openings,” even though during the relevant time periods there were openings and other persons were hired for the evening shift. That notation does not appear on any other application, and none of Buckley’s witnesses could identify who wrote it or when it appeared.
Despite testimony to the contrary, the commission found that Buckley had entered discussion about Young’s race and had decided not to hire her on that basis. The commission thus concluded that Buckley’s reason for not hiring Young (that she was not the best-qualified applicant for the job) was a pretext and that she would have been hired but for her race.
The commission awarded Young $6,986 plus interest for lost wages and $2,000 for emotional distress. Besides the monetary award to Young, the nursing facility had been instructed by the commission to develop a minority recruitment program. On appeal by the facility, the trial court upheld the commission’s decision. On further appeal, the appeals court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the nursing facility’s rejection of the applicant occurred after consideration of her race.
