Filtering Offenses
Denying the problem is probably used as often as any other single option, but denial is self-deceit. It works nicely for petty conveniences and immaterial human error (we forget that he put that pen in his pocket). The idea that ethical offense is a matter of degree, of gradations, is the point of the exercise. Managers routinely sort misdeeds by discounting for imputed motive, intent, impact, and widespread agreement (in the agency or community) about wrongdoing and other factors. Selectivity—choosing your battles in a principled way—does not change the ethics of the violation but does affect the response (reaction, remedy, penalty).
Where do you draw the line? Judith N. Shklar observes, “Most of us may intuitively agree about right and wrong, but we also, and far more significantly, differ enormously in the ways in which we rank the virtues and the vices.” What is the difference between pocketing a pen and taking home a PC? The dollar value? Only in part; the smaller infractions have a huge aggregate impact. Similarly, is the number of pages duplicated on the office machine the issue, or is it the principle of personal use of public property? Are effects measured as one-shot, cumulative, or aggregate, and does the result affect a manager’s response?
Reasonable selectivity runs the risk of appearing to be arbitrary enforcement of standards or preferential treatment of individuals. Problems arise precisely because it is so hard to specify decision-making criteria in advance. Yet these criteria are im- portant precisely when the manager is picking and choosing.
