BEGGING THE QUESTION
Reasoning in a circle is normally bad reasoning, but it is not easy to say exactly what is bad about it. The problem with circular reasoning becomes clearer when we notice that the same basic defect is shared by arguments that are not circular. Instead of arguing, “Terrorists can’t be stopped without torture, so they can’t,” we could avoid circularity by adding a few words to get this new argument:
If terrorists can be stopped without torture, then I’m a monkey’s uncle. I’m not a monkey’s uncle.
Terrorists can’t be stopped without torture.
This argument is not circular, because neither premise repeats the conclu- sion. It is also valid, and it might even be sound. Still, it is no good as an ar- gument for the same reason as “Terrorists can’t be stopped without torture, so it can’t.” The problem lies in its first premise. The consequent of the first premise (“I’m a monkey’s uncle”) is obviously false, so that first premise is false unless its antecedent (“Terrorists can be stopped without torture.”) is false. But that means that the conclusion must be true in order for the first premise to be true. Thus, one could not have any reason to believe the first premise if one did not already have the very same reason to believe the con- clusion. One’s reason to believe the premise depends on one’s prior belief in the conclusion or on one’s reason to believe the conclusion. In short, one has no independent reason for the premise.
